A COMPARISON OF BEHAVIOURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF EXECUTIVES IN ACCOUNTING DISINFORMATION OF REGISTERED FIRMS WITH OR WITHOUT SEC’S REQUIREMENTS OF AMENDING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND SPECIAL AUDITING
Keywords:
earning management, financial misstatements, special auditAbstract
This study aims to analyze, compare and investigate executives’ behavioral patterns in accounting disinformation of the listed companies that are required or not required to amend the financial statements and be under special auditing by the Securities and Exchange Commission. A total of 68 cases were included with the data from 2011 to 2020 and used in statistical analysis. The results are as follows: 1) the executives of the listed companies ordered by the Securities and Exchange Commission to amend the financial statements and to be examined as a special case were found to violate more financial terms and had statistically significant difference from the group management who were not required to do so at confidence levels of 99.9 percent and 95 percent; 2) there is no difference in accounting disinformation behavior among the executives of the companies required to amend the financial statements and investigated as a special case of financial misstatement. When conducting a content-based analysis in conjunction with the SEC's news issues, it was found that most executives behaved in the same direction as accounting disinformation; and 3) The behavioral characteristics of accounting disinformation consists of 3 components: executive intent, breach of financial conditions, and executive interests. The benefits obtained from this research the presentation of executive behavior in accounting disinformation.
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